The significance of care-ethics in a world of moral rules

The significance of care-ethics in a world of moral rules

Guy Pinku

(1) This article suggests that even if we accept the claim that generalization of ethics requires rules, ( and I think that we need to accept this claim) care-ethics nevertheless plays an important educational role. The article begins with a description of care-ethics and behaving according to rules, as presented by Noddings (1984). Then, following Buber (1970) and Noddings (1984), I argue that generalization of ethics by rules, leads to the loss of inner emotional motivation for moral action. Moreover, people usually follow rules out of social pressure. Hence, I suggest that care-ethics is important on the interpersonal level, since it compensates for some of the shortcomings of generalization of ethics when applying rules. This analysis highlights the complexity of moral education.

(2) Noddings (1984) suggests that moral action is based upon care. To be exact, Noddings argues that ethical caring is based upon natural caring. Natural caring is a "…relation in which we respond as one caring out of love and inclination" (Noddings, 1984, p.5). For example, when a mother hears her child crying, she does not make an effort to develop the desire to relieve the child's distress, she wants to do so. Thus, relieving the child's distress is not a moral action. Ethical caring is an extension of natural caring. We perceive the condition of being-cared for or caring-for, as good. Therefore, we want to maintain and even enhance our caring attitude. So, in states in which we do not naturally care, we make an effort to care.

(3) Noddings argues that "To care is to act not by fixed rule but by affection and regard"(1984, p.24). In order to care, one needs to apprehend the reality of the cared-for as a genuine possibility for oneself, i.e. to feel how it is to be in her position. This condition of emotional involvement leads to action which aims to enhance the welfare of the cared-for individual. On the other hand, in behaving according to rules, one analyzes the situation according to the rule and decides what action to take. Therefore, one removes oneself from emotional involvement with a particular person in a concrete situation, to the abstract point of view of the rule. Moreover, the rule often gives the person "the minimum requirement of caring" (Noddings, 1984, p. 51). Acting according to the rule is convenient; one may act automatically and do 'the right thing,'  without emotional involvement. Noddings begins the first chapter of her book, Caring (1984), with a description: "Everywhere we hear the complaint 'Nobody cares!'" (p.7). Well, one may say, nobody cares because everybody behaves according to the rules.

(4) Noddings' (1984) description of care-ethics and acting according to rules is based upon Gilligan's (1982) insight. However, there is also an affinity between care-ethics and Buber's (1970) distinction between the I-You and I-It relations. The I-It relation is associated with knowledge, and with Bacon's maxim 'knowledge is power.'  In the I-It relation, one learns the characteristics of an object due to interest and gain (For example, to use, to manipulate, or even to help). The process of learning is a process of comparison (to similar objects), generalizing, and conceptualization. For example, a physician diagnoses the patient's state in order to find the right treatment. The physician looks to identify the patient's illness. That is to say, the physician looks for what is general in the state of that particular patient. The patient herself, as a particular individual, is not interesting to the physician. (5) On the other hand, "The relation to the You is unmediated. Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no prior knowledge and no imagination" (Buber, 1970, p.62). In the I-You relation the focus is on the encounter with the particular individual. There is neither comparison, nor generalization. Instead of analyzing the You, one encounters the You as a whole and realizes her uniqueness. The care-ethics is consistent with the I-You relation, whereas rule-following is consistent with the I-It relation. Rules are generalizations, hence when one follows rules, the uniqueness of the state in which the rules are implied is lost. Therefore, rule-following is incompatible with emotional involvement (which is central in care-ethics).

(6) The focus of care ethics is on the caring for those persons that the individual encounters. However, there is another category of care:"caring about". "Caring about" relates to circumstances "in which we care about others even though we cannot care directly for them" (Noddings, 2002, p. 22). For example, "I can 'care about' the starving children of Cambodia, send five dollars to hunger relief, and feel somewhat satisfied" (Noddings, 1984, p.112). In situations of caring about, one does not encounter the cared for, hence, typically, one's emotional involvement is superficial. For this reason, Noddings (1984) claims that caring about is "too easy" (p.112).

(7) Caring about is an extension of care ethics to the social level. Hence, the shortcoming of "caring about" demonstrates the limitations of care ethics. Care ethics is adequate on the interpersonal level; that is, care ethics relates to the face-to-face realm. However, with regard to the social level, care ethics per se is not enough. Moral concerns on the social level require consideration of the society as a whole, and this implies generalization, norms, and rules. Hence, on the social level care ethics has limited importance. For example, it may contribute to the formulation of principles of justice and social policy (Okin, 1989; Noddings, 2002).

(8) I shall argue that although care ethics is not central on the social level, it is central on the interpersonal level, since it compensates for some of the shortcomings of the generalization of ethics on the social level. Freud suggests that when people act morally because of rules, they do so due to irrational feelings. Current research in social psychology supports this analysis. (9) There are two relevant points about morality and rule-following, conveyed by social psychology nowadays (Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010):(1) The "affective primacy" principle. It seems that the influence of moral reasoning on moral behavior is quite limited. Affect-laden evaluation processes, i.e. feeling of like or dislike, are the main building blocks of human morality. Haidt (2007) portrays it as follows:

When we think about sticking a pin into a child's hand, or we hear a story about a person slapping her father, most of us have an automatic intuitive reaction that includes a flash of negative affect. We often engage in conscious verbal reasoning too, but this controlled process can occur only after the first automatic processes has run, and it is often influenced by the initial moral intuition. Moral reasoning, when it occurs, is usually a post-hoc process in which we search for evidence to support our initial intuitive reaction(p. 998).

(2) The notion of "indirect reciprocity". Reciprocal altruism (altruism that is targeted at kin) cannot explain cooperation with strangers and making sacrifices for large groups composed of non-kin. Indirect reciprocity is an extension of reciprocal altruism. It is suggested that "people help others in order to develop a good reputation, which elicits future cooperation from others" (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p.810). A good reputation is an important social force that motivates people to follow moral rules. Haidt (2007) presents this notion in the form of two cynical rules:"The first rule […] is:Be careful of what you do. The second rule is: What you do matters less than what people think that you did" (p.999).

(10) Combining the "affective primacy" principle and the notion of "indirect reciprocity," leads to the claim that in order to constrain selfishness by moral rules, social pressure is needed. That is, people usually follow moral rules due to social pressure. They are motivated by fear and shame, and not by rational moral thinking, as Kohlberg (1971), who follows Kantian ideas, has suggested.

 (11)  But this is not enough for a good society. There are shortcomings of a moral order which is based upon rules only: (1) Rules are limited; there are always gaps. Rules cannot cover all possible situations. (2) There are high prices for motivating people to follow rules. For example, monitoring of human behavior is complicated and expensive. (3) Acting morally due to social pressure leads to a social climate of struggle. (4) Rules usually set up minimal norms of moral demands (usually the prevention of physical harm) but do not impose positive duties (for example, helping people in trouble).

(12) Instead of fear and shame (that are associated with rules and social pressure), care ethics highlights different feeling that may lead people to act morally: an inner motivation to care. In contrast to fear and shame, acting morally out of an inner motivation to care creates a positive social climate of cooperation. Moreover, care-ethics has a stable basis:"The caring attitude, that attitude which expresses our earliest memories of being cared for and our growing store of memories of both caring and being cared for, is universally accessible" (Noddings, 1984, p.5). Hence, care-ethics may balance a possible negative shift in social norms and social rules. (13)  I believe that June, a character in McEwan's (1992) novel, Black Dogs, raises a similar idea:

(14) The evil I'm talking about lives in us all. It takes hold in an individual, in private lives […] And then when the conditions are right, in different countries, at different times, a terrible cruelty, a viciousness against life erupts, and everyone is surprised by the depth of hatred within himself. Then it sinks back and waits. […] Human nature, the human heart, the spirit, the soul, consciousness itself- call it what you like- in the end, it's all we've got to work with. It has to develop and expand, or the sum of our misery will never diminish […] The work we have to do is with ourselves if we're ever going to be at peace with each other. I'm not saying it'll happen. There's a good chance it won't. […] If it does, and it could take generations, the good that follows from it will shape our societies in unprogrammed, unforeseen way, under the control of no single group of people or set of ideas (p. 147).

(15) One may think of care-ethics as a transformative process in which the caring mode, which characterizes parent-child relations and family ties, expands to other circles of interpersonal relations. So, even if we accept the importance of rules on the social level, care-ethics still plays an important educational role: nurturing the good will of the individual itself.

(16)  This analysis highlights the complexity of moral education: The interpersonal level implies the importance of caring (Noddings, 1997), however, the social level implies the importance of behaving according to social rules. The educator resembles a person who holds two separate pairs of glasses, and needs to switch swiftly between them.

 

Bibliography

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Haidt, J., & Kesebir, S. (2010). Morality. In S. Fiske, & D. Gilbert (Eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology, 5th Edition

McEwan, I. (1992). Black dogs, New York: Anchor books.

Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Noddings, N. (1997). A Morally Defensible Mission for Schools in the 21st Century, in Clinchy, Evans, (ed). Transforming Public Education: A New Course for America’s Future.

Noddings, N. (2002). Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy, Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

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